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stick with any swizzle stick, because there are no swizzle sticks.
Consequently we see that if the swizzle stick and the gizzle gick
are not identical, as Quine argues, then they are identical only qua
swizzle stick. In either event, we have no good reason for claiming
that gizzle gicks do not exist.
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IS THIS A SWIZZLE STICK WHICH I SEE BEFORE ME?
By PATRICK GRIM
OUINE AND UNGER take sorites arguments seriously against theexistence of objects as normal as swizzle sticks, but both suggest
precise replacements on the order of '1-billion-atom swizzle sticks'
([31> [4])- W. R. Abbott [1] agrees with me that at least these will
not do.
But what of more carefully constructed precise replacements
such as gizzle gicks? With a few hedges these are defined as con-
figurations of plastic molecules within a 100 molecule range of the
closest physical approximation to a perfect 5" swizzloid, a shape
patterned on that of an imagined paradigm swizzle stick.
Might not gizzle gicks escape sorites arguments? No — or so I
originally argued, We start with the existential supposition
(9) There is at least one gizzle gick,
and note that this is inconsistent with:
(10) If anything is a gizzle gick, that is sufficient for it to be a
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(11) If anything is a swizzle stick, in the ordinary sense of the
term, then it consists of more than one atom, but only a
finite number.
(12) If anything is a swizzle stick, in the ordinary sense of the
term, then the net removal from it of one atom, or only a
few, in a manner most innocuous and favourable, will not
mean the difference as to whether or not there is a swizzle
stick there, in the ordinary sense of the term ([2], p. 42).
(10), I argued, rests on linguistic intuititions at least as compelling
as those behind Unger's original premises, represented here as (11)
and (12). But if we are to maintain (10) through (12) within the
bounds of consistency we must also deny (9); taking sorites argu-
ments seriously, there are no gizzle gicks, either.
It is (10) that Abbott attacks.
Suppose that you were to put a gizzle gick, suitably defined,
before me now. It's plastic, remember, and quite nearly swizzloid —
the ideal shape of an imagined paradigm swizzle stick. It's also blue,
perhaps, or a peculiar shade of fuscia, and perfect for stirring
bloody marys.
Is this a swizzle stick which I see before me?
'Yes', I say — or at least so I said originally.
'No', says Abbott. Gizzle gicks and swizzle sticks have different
identity conditions. A swizzle stick can shed atoms and remain a
swizzle stick, but a gizzle gick that loses one atom too many is no
longer a gizzle gick. Gizzle gicks are thus not identical to swizzle
sticks, and so (10) is false — that this is a gizzle gick is not sufficient
for it to be a swizzle stick in the ordinary sense of the term.
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Abbott's argument introduces a range of questions regarding
identity and existence, and I think his treatment of these is wrong
in a number of respects. I also consider these deep and difficult
issues, however, and cannot hope to address them adequately here.
Luckily, I don't have to. For identity is simply a red herring — it
is not in fact at issue, and the argument can easily be phrased
without it.
Unger avoids similar complications of identity by phrasing his
sorites arguments without it — (12) above, for example, maintains
only that there will be a swizzle stick after the removal of an atom,
not that the same swizzle stick will survive (see also Unger's discus-
sion of avoiding identity in [4], pp. 118-21). Here we can follow
suit.
We do not in fact need (10) in the form that Abbott attacks. We
need only (10'):
(10') If anything is a gizzle gick, that is sufficient for there to be
a swizzle stick, in the ordinary sense of the term.
No gizzle gick, then, need be a swizzle stick. All we need is this:
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something before you that would qualify as a swizzle stick in the
ordinary sense of the term. With an eye to the definition of gizzle
gick, and an appreciation for ordinary notions of swizzle sticks, I
don't think that can plausibly be denied.
(10') still, of course, rests on linguistic intuitions. But these
intuitions seem at least as firm as those behind (11) and (12),
borrowed from Unger's original. Issues of identity of the sort
Abbott raises don't touch (10') at all.
The argument above with (10') substituted for (10) has the same
force as before. If we are to maintain (10') through (12) within the
bounds of consistency, we must also deny (9); there are no gizzle
gicks, either.
If we are to take sorites arguments seriously, then, even precise
replacements of this sort will fall victim. And identity considerations
such as Abbott's will not be enough to save them.
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AYER'S DEFINITION OF EMPIRICAL SIGNIFICANCE
REVISITED
By M. L. POKRIEFKA
AYER'S definition of empirical significance is open to decisive^objections by Hempel, Church, Scheffler and Ullian. The
definition can be repaired so as to evade these and similar objec-
tions. This may come as a surprise to those who believe, with
Scheffler, that 'no further restrictions on additional premises for
definitions of the Ayer type can reasonably be expected to rule out
all conjunctions with nonsensical components' (7, p. 155). Before
offering a definition that does rule out all such conjunctions, it
will be helpful to review Ayer's definition, some objections, some
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